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The Supreme Court Performs the
Right Notes for Dish in Aereo
Lee B. Burgunder*
ABSTRACT
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., the
Supreme Court addressed whether a company publicly performs
copyrighted works when it allocates separate antennas on its property
to customers who individually decide what shows they each want to
watch. This case was hotly debated because it provided a new
opportunity for the Court to identify the responsible actors when
copyrighted materials are transmitted over the Internet. Unfortunately,
the Court ruled against Aereo without clearly articulating governing
standards that might inform future decisions, relying instead on what
the dissent called a "looks-like-cable-TV" approach. The deficiency has
already provided additional ammunition for Fox Broadcasting
Company to sue Dish Network over certain features that the satellite
television provider proudly promotes to customers. This Article
articulates some concrete benchmarks the Court could have used to
substantiate its decision that would have highlighted the weaknesses in
Fox's latest copyright claims against Dish.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court addressed another issue in an increasingly long line of
disputes wherein new innovations challenge old intellectual property
laws that were designed to address technologies with different or more
limited capabilities. Occasionally, the Court has provided definitive
guidance, as it did in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., by emphasizing the importance of intent when addressing
contributory liability with copyrights.2 However, in a string of more
recent intellectual property cases, the Court has made decisions using
a "you know it when you see it" approach to jurisprudence.3
Interestingly, in each of these cases, the Court intuitively reached
what is probably the correct result, but did so without articulating
definitive standards that might help lower courts tackle subsequent
technological developments.4
1. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
2. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 962-63
(2005).
3. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (concluding that
a computerized trading platform to address settlement risk was not patentable subject matter
because it was clearly an abstract idea, even without defining the precise contours of the abstract
idea category); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118
(2013) (determining that isolated DNA is not patentable subject matter because it is a discovery
in nature and not an invention); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1298 (2012) (holding that the addition of routine steps to a law of nature does not make a
process patentable subject matter); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (deciding that a
process for hedging risk is an abstract idea that is not patentable without resorting to categorical
rules).
4. See, e.g., Emily M. Morris, Intuitive Patenting, 66 S.C. L. REV. 61, 117 (2014);
Jessica Belle, Note, Prometheus v. Mayo: Limited Implications for §101 Jurisprudence, 8 Wash.
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 555, 571 (2013); Alex Boguniewicz, Note, Discovering the Undiscoverable:
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In Aereo, the Court addressed whether a company publicly
performs copyrighted works when it allocates separate antennas on its
property to customers who individually decide what shows they each
want to watch. Once again, the Court majority reached the correct
conclusion by holding that the system seemed too much like a
traditional cable operator to get off the hook from paying public
performance fees.5 However, the Court did not directly define the
attributes of Aereo's system that made it so clearly analogous to
traditional cable, leaving the door wide open for future litigation.
Indeed, Fox Broadcasting Company has recently used Aereo as
additional ammunition to sue Dish Network over certain new features
that the satellite television provider now offers to customers.6 As we
shall see, the Supreme Court could have easily articulated some
concrete benchmarks that would have substantiated its decision and,
thus, would have more clearly highlighted some of the weaknesses in
Fox's latest copyright claims that it has raised against Dish.'
II. COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
The Copyright Act provides copyright owners numerous
exclusive rights.8 The exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies
is probably the best known, but there are several others, including the
rights to perform and display the copyrighted work publicly.9 The Act
further defines the circumstances under which a person performs or
displays a work publicly:
To perform or display a work "publicly" means -
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. 10
Patent Eligibility of DNA and the Future of Biotechnical Patent Claims Post-Myriad, 10 WASH.
J.L. TECH. & ARTS 35, 49 (2014); Jake Gipson, Note, Patentable Subject Matter: A Myriad of
Problems, 65 ALA. L. REV. 815, 830-831 (2013).
5. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
6. See, e.g., Greg Avery, Fox Wants Aereo Supreme Court Ruling Applied to Dish
Network's Hopper, DENVER BUS. J. (June 30, 2014, 2:07 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/
bloglboostersbits/2014/06/fox-wants-aereo-supreme-court-ruling-applied-to.html?page=all.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
9. § 106(4)-(5).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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Of these two provisions, the first is probably the easiest to
understand. For instance, an individual who rents a DVD of a movie
and plays it at home to an audience of family and friends does not
make a public performance, which would require permission from the
copyright owner. Similarly, a group of friends can watch a television
broadcast at a person's home without violating copyright privileges.
On the other hand, a sports bar that shows a movie or allows patrons
to watch Monday Night Football on a big screen television would be
engaged in a public display or performance."
The second provision is intended to address situations in which
individuals use technologies to effectively show copyrighted works in a
remote location or locations. According to the Supreme Court, the
provision was primarily intended to make it clear that broadcasters
and cable operators make public performances when they retransmit
television programs to customers who then watch them at home or
elsewhere.12  However, Congress clearly thought ahead with the
amendment, ensuring it would appropriately cover new technologies
within the philosophical and economic considerations underpinning
the original concept of a public performance. So, consider the
individual who rents a DVD and uses a DVD player to watch it at
home. Assuming this person can obtain the necessary technology, the
Act would allow him to start the play function of the DVD player and
transmit the live performance, or in other words stream it, to a remote
location so that he or she could view it there. Thus, the Act directly
provides that an individual may engage in personal space shifting by
streaming copyrighted material so it can be viewed on a device at an
alternative site.13
Given that copyrights are intended to motivate the distribution
of creative new works, this result can be justified because the harm to
the copyright owner is minimal, at best.14 After all, the possessor of
11. The Copyright Act provides numerous limitations to the exclusive rights to perform
and display. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2012). One exception might allow the sports bar to show the
football game under specified conditions. See § 110(5)(B).
12. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504-06 (2014).
13. The public performance provision does not apply to those who wish to reproduce a
work on a device so that it can be viewed on that device at a different location. For this to be
lawful, the reproduction would have to fall within the fair use exception, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012),
according to the same form of logic used by the Supreme Court in Sony to legitimize time-shifting
with a VCR. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 497 (1984). Fair
use is addressed by considering four factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the use ... (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used . . .; and (4)
[market] effect . . 107. For further discussion, see infra notes 167-70 and accompanying
text.
14. It is possible to argue that some individuals who engage in personal streaming
might otherwise demand centralized services, and so the exemption for non-public transmissions
may reduce the value of the copyright. For this reason, the practice might not satisfy the criteria
848 [Vol. 17:4:845
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the rented DVD could watch the movie on any DVD player located in a
non-public environment. So, why should the law prevent him from
streaming that same copy to the remote location? In effect, it is
equivalent to a person with a sophisticated telescope watching the
movie from afar while it is being played at home. On the other hand,
this individual could not stream it to a remote location that is open to
the public. Nor could he or she show it to members of the public by
simultaneously streaming it to them at separate locations or
streaming it to them at different times to those separate places. The
latter would circumvent the statutory prohibition, since each
transmission might technically constitute a private viewing but the
overall effect would allow the public to see the movie from that one
DVD.
More to the point of the Aereo litigation, a person who has the
right to access and view a television signal at their home, or some
other location under their control, similarly may use technologies to
retransmit that signal to another place so that he or she can view it
there live. However, this person can neither retransmit the signal so
that it can be publicly viewed in one particular place nor use separate
transmissions to show it to individual members of the public situated
in different locations.
The primary ambiguity in the transmission provision is that it
does not specifically define the phrases "to the public" or "members of
the public." One interpretation is to assume that "the public" in this
provision refers to the same people as are specified in the first clause
regarding the contours of a public place. This is the interpretation
that the Supreme Court used when addressing the legality of Aereo's
transmission system.15 The Court stated, "although the Act does not
define 'the public,' . . . [it] suggests that 'the public' consists of a large
group of people outside of a family and friends."16 This, of course,
would mean that an individual may lawfully stream a copyrighted
program not only to himself at a remote location but also individually
to several other friends and family members who might otherwise
watch the content at home or some other private location.
As we shall see, this may provide subscribers to Dish's Dish
Anywhere system tremendous power to provide programming at no
for a fair use under Section 107, which serves to balance the economic harms from the practice
with other social goals, such as free speech. Nevertheless, Congress has categorically determined
that the activity is legal, presumably because the perceived economic harms to copyright owners
was not sufficiently significant for anyone to meaningfully object to the statutory exclusion. This
does not mean, however, that space shifting by other means, such as through reproductions of
copyrighted material, is necessarily a fair use. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
15. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509-10.
16. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
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cost to a large set of friends and relatives who live in different places.17
However, this is not the only possible interpretation. For instance, the
public might simply be anyone other than the possessor of the
copyrighted content. In this event, only personal space shifting via
live transmission would be allowed under the terms of this particular
provision.18 At the moment, the Supreme Court has spoken, and its
interpretation is clearly defensible given both the language of the Act
and available technologies at the time it was drafted. Thus, Congress
may need to reconsider whether the appopriate economic balance is
maintained in light of new transmission capabilities that are available
via the Internet.19
III. COMPANIES TEST THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
PRIOR TO AEREO
As one might expect, many companies have attempted to
establish business models that would allow them to perform or display
copyrighted works without violating the copyright owners' rights
under the Act. Each, in effect, has tested the reach of the statute, and
each success or failure within the legal system has helped shape the
parameters of subsequent new arrangements.
A. Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.20 is a
good place to start. The defendant, Redd Horne, established two video
rental stores, which each had numerous private booths where up to
four customers could watch videos. The videos were selected at a
central desk and then an employee would put the video in a video
cassette machine and transmit it to the appropriate booth. The store
was open to the public, but the patrons who watched the videos
together in the private booths were typically a small group of family or
17. Technologies are readily available, separate from Dish's system, which allow
subscribers to retransmit those signals to other locations. Slingbox, for instance, which is the
technology utilized by Dish, may also be purchased separately from Sling Media, Inc.
Information about the most recent models of Slingbox can be found on Sling Media's web site at
http://www.slingbox.com. Another product that allows remote streaming is Vulkano, which is a
product line developed by Monsoon Multimedia, Inc. Information about Vulkano is available on
Monsoon Multimedia's website at http://www.monsoonmultimedia.com.
18. The transmission might nonetheless not violate copyright privileges if it falls within
a limitation on those rights, such as fair use.
19. The Supreme Court recognized in Aereo that new technologies may present
potential new problems and that interested parties may need to seek action from Congress. See
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511.
20. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
850 [Vol. 17:4:845
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friends.21 Nonetheless, the court held that the operator was making a
public performance despite the fact that transmissions were made to
places that appeared to fall outside the strict definition of "public" in
the statute.22 The court first noted that the operation of each store
was the functional equivalent of a conventional movie theater, just
with additional privacy. In the court's view, the relevant "place" that
each movie was performed was not within a separate room but rather
within the entire facility, which overall was open to the public.23 The
court also noted that the same individual video cassette was
repeatedly used to transmit performances of its movie to different
members of the public over the course of time.24 According to the
court, multiple transmissions from the same copy of the copyrighted
material to different unrelated people at different times fell within the
second condition of the transmission clause in the definition of public
performance.25 For these reasons, the court held that the defendants
had performed the movies publicly without permission from the
copyright owners.26
B. Columbia Pictures v. Aveco
The next in the list of instructive relevant cases is Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc.2 7 In that case, patrons again
rented videos but, this time, could choose to watch them in rented
private rooms within Aveco's facility using video cassette players
located in the rooms themselves.28 Aveco believed that it had avoided
the centralized transmissions problem encountered in Redd Horn by
giving customers physical control over the videotapes and the
privately located VCRs.29 After all, since there was no dispute that a
customer could rent a video and watch it odtside the facility in a
private place with friends and family, why would it be any different if
they rented the video and watched it privately with the same people
21. Id. at 156-57.
22. See id. at 158-59.




27. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 61. Customers had three rental options at Aveco's facilities: (1) they could rent
videos and watch them outside the premises; (2) they could rent rooms within the premises and
bring in their own videos; or (3) they could rent videos at the facilities and rent rooms to watch
those videos inside the same premises. Id.
29. Id. at 63.
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inside the premises?30 The court, however, perceived a difference.
Since each individual room could be used successively by different
groups of people, they were, in a sense, open to the public.31 And since
Aveco authorized the viewing in those rooms, it could be held
responsible for performing the works in places open to the public.32
This was true, according to the court, whether Aveco rented the
videos, or customers brought in their own videos to watch in Aveco's
rooms.33
In reaching its conclusion that Aveco made a public
performance, the court focused on the nature or purpose of Aveco's
business, which was to operate a facility that was available to the
public for viewing videos.34 Thus, the type of place where the
performance may be viewed is a material factor in determining
whether the performance is public. If it is at a place where unrelated
individuals can use the same equipment or facilities to watch
copyright content, then this increases the likelihood that the operator
is performing publicly. In addition, if the operator's primary purpose
is to provide a convenient facility where customers may view
copyrighted performances, this too increases the likelihood that it is
engaged in public performances.
C. The Hotel Video Cases
The next pair of relevant cases involved hotels that provided
guests the opportunity to watch videos in their rooms. The first
dispute, Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc., involved a hotel that simply rented videodiscs to their
guests so they could watch them using DVD players located in their
rooms.3 5 The copyright owners, following the logic of Aveco, claimed
that, since the rooms were rented to successive people, the hotel was
making a public performance.36 The court disagreed, however, finding
that the nature of a hotel is to provide private accommodations, which
may incidentally include the rental of videodiscs.37 Thus, once again,
30. The movie producers did not challenge the rental of video cassettes for at-home
viewing. Id. at 61.
31. See id. at 63.
32. See id. at 62 (stating that Aveco, by enabling its customers to perform the video
cassettes in the viewing rooms, authorized the performances).
33. See id. at 64.
34. See id. at 63.
35. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
36. Id. at 280-81.
37. See id. at 281.
852 [Vol. 17:4:845
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the overriding purpose of the enterprise proved to be an important
factor for distinguishing whether the service truly involved private
showings or rather was a subterfuge to evade the strict application of
the law.
The second case, On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries,38 involved an electronic video delivery system used
by hotels so guests could rent and watch videos in their rooms without
having to leave their private accommodations. Effectively, when
guests wanted to watch a video, they merely had to choose from an
on-screen list, and a centralized, preloaded video cassette player
would transmit the videotape to the television in the private room.
Once the video had started, the guest could not stop, rewind, or
fast-forward the playback. Also, since the guest was using the
machine containing the selected video, no other room could access and
watch it until the playback to the original guest had been completed.39
On first blush, the system appears to merely facilitate private
hotel viewing, which the court in Professional Real Estate Investors
had already found lawful. The primary difference was that the guest
did not have control over the playback of the video once it had begun.
Also, the system increased the physical efficiencies of the hotel's
distribution system by potentially eliminating the time lags between
rentals and returns. This may have allowed the hotel to purchase
fewer videos to satisfy the rental demands of customers. In any event,
the court held that hotels using the system engaged in public
performances since they transmitted performances from the same
videotape to different groups of private audiences at different times.40
Apparently, copyrights are intended to provide owners economic
incentives by giving them some rights to control individual
convenience. This conclusion is not only relevant to the notion of
public performances, but may also be important in other debates, such
as with reproductions for personal space shifting.
D. The Zediva Online DVD Service
Fast-forwarding to a more recent case, WTV Systems tested
the limits of the public performance right when it created a service
called Zediva, which it described as an online DVD rental service.41
The system worked much like that in On Command, although
38. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
39. Id. at 788.
40. See id. at 790.
41. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
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customers had slightly more control over the performance of the
content. Specifically, WTV Systems, like a traditional DVD rental
service, bought DVDs that it made available for customers to rent.
But instead of allowing customers to physically take the DVDs,
employees preloaded the DVDs into separate DVD players located at
its facilities. Customers then were given the ability to stream selected
content over the Internet from appropriate DVD players for a 14-day
rental period.42 Once a customer started the playback of a DVD from
a particular player, he or she could pause the stream, but if the pause
lasted more than an hour, another customer would be given access to
that DVD player.43 When the customer wished to resume viewing, the
content would be streamed from another player containing the same
movie, but if none were available, the customer would have to wait
until a player with the movie was free.44 The customers did not have
other types of control typically associated with the playback of DVDs,
such as rewinding or fast-forwarding capabilities.45 They also did not
have access to special features or other content on the DVD. 4 6
WTV Systems argued that it merely rented DVDs to customers
and that the customers then transmitted the movies to themselves.47
However, this argument failed for numerous reasons. For starters,
the company's employees, not the customers, loaded the DVDs into the
players.48  Further, the system also potentially allowed multiple
customers to access the same DVD during a single rental period.
Thus, WTV Systems could not even argue that it rented a DVD along
with a particular player, which the customer could then exclusively
control during the rental period. This serves to distinguish its
business model from physical DVD rental services, such as the one
found to be legal in Professional Real Estate Investors. Also, the
customer did not have primary control over the transmission; rather,
the service significantly constrained the nature, duration, and
availability of the transmission, similar to the online hotel DVD rental
system found to be illegal in On Command. Therefore, given the
42. Id. at 1006-07.
43. Id. at 1007.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1007 n.2.
47. Zediva argued that it did not have the necessary "volition" to be a direct infringer,
but rather only established a mechanical system that was used by customers to perform the
transmissions. Id. at 1011 n.7. The court stated that the argument was unpersuasive and that
the Ninth Circuit, in any event, had not adopted the volitional conduct requirement for direct
infringement. See id. For a discussion of "volition" and its relationship to direct infringement, see
infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
48. As we shall see, this weakens Zediva's argument that it acted without "volition." See
infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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operation of the system, the court concluded that WTV Systems was
clearly transmitting performances of the copyrighted content.49 In
addition, the court also determined that the transmissions were to the
public, since it streamed the same content at different times from the
same DVDs to multiple unrelated viewers.50 As in Redd Horn and On
Command, this is a signature act of a public performance. The court
consequently imposed a preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable injury, since the Zediva service
threatened the copyright owners' ability to profit from authorized
video-on-demand services.5 1
E. Cablevision's Remote DVR System
Although preceding WTV Systems, the case that primarily set
the stage for the design of Aereo's technology was Cartoon Network LP
v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,52 which sanctioned a particular application of a
remote storage DVR (RS-DVR) system. In essence, the cable
television distributor, Cablevision, established a process allowing
customers to store live programming on Cablevision's servers, rather
than on at-home (or set-top) devices, so that the programs could be
viewed later in the same way as they could with traditional personal
equipment. The legality of personal television recording devices was
first litigated in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
and the Supreme Court held that individuals could legally copy
over-the-air television programs so that they could view the programs
at more convenient times-a practice called time-shifting.5 3  Given
that time-shifting was a significant non-infringing use of the machine,
the seller of the machine could not be held contributorily liable for
impermissible uses of the machine, such as saving the programs for
multiple future viewings.54 This decision legitimized the distribution
of recording devices, including DVRs such as TiVo and similar
49. See WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1009.
50. See id. at 1011 n.7.
51. See id. at 1012-14.
52. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
53. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984).
54. The Court determined that a seller of copying equipment is not liable for
contributory infringement if the machine is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. See id. at
442. It also determined that unauthorized time shifting was a substantial noninfringing use
because it fell within the fair use exception. See id. at 447-55. Saving programs for multiple
future viewings is known as "librarying." Making reproductions with VCRs for the purpose of
librarying is almost certainly not a fair use due to the substantial economic effects that such
reproductions may have on the copyright owners' ability to profit from their protected content.
The Supreme Court made note of this by approving the district court's finding "that the time-
shifting without librarying would result in not a great deal of harm." Id. at 451 (emphasis
added).
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machines that are often provided by cable and satellite companies.
Cablevision's goal was to provide customers the exact same
functionality that they could have with their own DVR but also allow
them to save the programming on computer storage space specially
allocated to them on Cablevision's servers.55
Without getting overly technical, when a cable customer
chooses to save a program on a DVR, the system essentially splits the
signal that has been lawfully transmitted to the customer's location so
that the signal travels both to the television, where it can be viewed
live, and to the set-top DVR, where it is stored for future uses. With
Cablevision's RS-DVR system, the signal is split at Cablevision's
premises and is separately and uniquely stored for the customer on
Cablevision's machines rather than on a personal set-top device.56
When the customer chooses to view the stored content, the signal with
the content is automatically transmitted to the customer at the
location that the original live signal was delivered.57
Before delving into the court's legal analysis, it is useful to take
a broad view of what is happening here to avoid losing sight of the
proverbial forest by focusing on the trees. First, the copyright owners
grant Cablevision the legal right to transmit live signals carrying the
copyrighted content to customers at specific geographic locations and
the customers thereby gain rights, through their subscriptions, to
access those signals and view the associated programs. When
customers use Cablevision's RS-DVR, it changes nothing except where
the content carried by those signals is temporarily stored. The
customers control the operation of the recording device in exactly
the same fashion as they would operate set-top boxes.58 This
differentiates the situation from the technologies used in Redd Horne,
On-Command, and WTV Systems, in which the customers had far less
control over the playback of the performances. The customers also
end up viewing the same content in the same way at the same places
as they could have if they had used set-top boxes instead of
Cablevision's remote storage system. Thus, the technology does not
make life more convenient for customers, as it does not save them
trips to rental stores or hotel front desks, or allow them to take or
view content in other places.
55. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 125. The court stated that to the customer, the
processes of recording and playback on the RS-DVR are similar to that of a standard set-top
DVR. The principle difference in the operation is that the viewer sends signals to Cablevision's
remote facility instead of to an on-set box. Id.
56. Id. at 124-25.
57. The customer's unique copy is encrypted and can only be decoded by the customer's
particular cable box. Id. at 135.
58. Id. at 125.
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Again, this distinguishes the situation from On Command, in
particular, where customer convenience was a significant goal.5 9
Therefore, even if copyrights were intended to provide owners some
rights to control customer convenience over obtaining access to
protected content, those rights would not be implicated here. In fact,
the only thing that is changed by Cablevision's system is the character
of the machine that is used to carry out the exact same operations.
But, as the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit so clearly stated
in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,60 copyrights
do not give copyright owners the right to control the machines that are
used to play their content.61 Thus, before resorting to the language of
the statute and the applications of the specific legal provisions, there
intuitively seems to be no reason to conclude that Cablevision has
done anything wrong by introducing its RS-DVR system.
The copyright owners sued Cablevision, arguing that
Cablevision should be directly liable both for reproducing copies of
their copyrighted programming on its servers without permission and
for transmitting that content, without authority, to the public in
violation of their public performance rights.62  Regarding the
reproductions, the court determined that the customers actually made
the copies because only they had the appropriate "volitional conduct,"
a concept that was first articulated in Religious Technology Center v.
Netcom On-Line Communications.63 According to Netcom, the mere
fact that someone owns or operates a machine that makes copies of
content at the initiation of a third party does not necessarily make
that person directly liable for the reproductions made by that
machine.64 The Netcom court compared those operating servers on the
Internet to businesses that make photocopy machines available to the
public, entities that have never been accused of direct liability.65
Based on this analogy, the Netcom court determined that there must
59. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 788-89
(N.D. Cal. 1991). Zediva also provided convenience by saving customers from the trouble of
having to make trips to video rental stores to obtain DVD content. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v.
WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1006-07 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
60. Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
61. In Connectix, Sony sued the developer of software that enabled Sony games to play
on different consoles. The Ninth Circuit ruled that copyright does confer copyright holders
control over the market for devices that play games. See id. at 607.
62. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 124.
63. See id. at 131; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'ns, 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995). For the Second Circuit's discussion of volitional conduct, see Cartoon Network,
536 F.3d at 131-32.
64. See Netcorn, 907 F. Supp. at 1369.
65. See id.
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be "some element of volition or causation" to pin liability on the owner
of the machine.66
Following the same logic, the Second Circuit believed that
Cablevision did not engage in the necessary volitional conduct to hold
it liable for direct infringement, since the copies were made at the
behest of customers. In reaching this conclusion, several issues were
important to the court. First, Cablevision provided a system that
mechanically made reproductions of television programs without
involving its own personnel in the process of creating the copies.67 In
addition, Cablevision did not select the programs that customers were
able to copy. Rather, the programs were provided via the channels
that the copyright owners authorized Cablevision to transmit to
customers. These conditions are in stark contrast to attributes
underlying the Zediva service, for one, in which humans actually
selected and loaded the videos into the video recorders.68
It is worth noting several additional points about volitional
conduct here because the dissent in Aereo overlooked their importance
in its analysis. In a case subsequent o Netcom, the Fourth Circuit
made the following observations about volitional conduct:
[T]o establish direct liability ... something more must be shown than mere ownership of
a machine used by others to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could
conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the
copyright owner.6 9
According to this statement, an owner of a mechanical process
acts with volition when the owner is such a knowing and active
participant in the third party's infringement that it is fair to consider
it an accomplice to the direct infringement.70 Thus, when a third
party uses a mechanical system to copy or deliver content that it
independently acquired from other unrelated sources, there is no way
to connect the operator's conduct to the third party's illegal activity.
66. Id. at 1370.
67. In contrast to a copy shop that provides machines for customers to operate,
businesses with employees who make copies at the request of customers, such as Kinko's, are
liable for direct infringement when they reproduce copyrighted material without permission,
unless their actions fall within a limitation on a copyright owner's exclusive rights, such as fair
use. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
68. Humans were also involved with selecting content and loading machines in On
Command and Redd Horne.
69. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
70. According to the Second Circuit, "the purpose of any causation-based liability
doctrine is to identify the actor (or actors) whose 'conduct has been so significant and important a
cause that [he or she] should be legally responsible."' Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132 (quoting
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984)).
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However, this does not mean that all designers or operators of
mechanical systems can wipe their hands from potential culpability
for direct infringement. For instance, if the owner of the machine or
system unlawfully provides the content to the third party without the
authority of the copyright owner, while knowing that the third party
intends to use its machine to violate the copyrights in that content,
then there may be a sufficient nexus to the third party's infringing
activity to conclude that the machine owner directly trespassed on the
exclusive domain of the copyright owner.71 Or, as another example,
suppose a proprietor of a bookstore that solely contains copyrighted
books provides a copy machine that is only capable of making
complete reproductions of entire works. In this instance, one could
easily conclude that the machine owner acts with sufficient "volition"
to hold it directly liable for its customers' illegal activities, since the
only possible result of its conduct is infringement.72
Neither of these scenarios, of course, applies to Cablevision's
RS-DVR system, since Cablevision originally provided its customers
legal access to the copyrighted content, and many customers lawfully
make copies for time-shifting. For these reasons, the Second Circuit
held "that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the RS-DVR
system are 'made' by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision's
contribution to this reproduction by providing the system does not
warrant the imposition of direct liability."73
In addition to concluding that Cablevision was not directly
liable for any infringing reproductions made with the RS-DVR system,
71. Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (finding liability for direct infringement when the computer operator actively
encouraged customers to upload copyrighted content and employees actively moved the content
to files generally available to subscribers).
72. See, e.g., Elektra Records, Co. v. Gem Electronic Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821,
823 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding direct infringement by business proprietor when customers used
coin operated "Make-a-Tape" system to create 8-track copies of sound recordings provided at the
store). The Supreme Court warned in Sony that "the lines between direct infringement,
contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn." Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984). One might be tempted to argue that
even the hypothesized scenario involves contributory liability, since the machine owner does not
actually push the button that starts the reproduction process. Nonetheless, when there are
absolutely no or very few potential non-infringing uses of the machine, the distinction is
phantom, and of course, the result is exactly the same in each instance, given that the machine
owner is conclusively liable under each framework of analysis. This is because the seller or
operator of a machine is liable for contributory liability if: (1) there are not any "substantial
noninfringing uses" of that machine, see Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; (2) the operator knows about the
infringing conduct and has an opportunity to stop it, see A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1019-22 (9th Cir. 2000); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'ns, 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995); or (3) the seller or operator induces the infringing conduct,
see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
73. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133.
2015] 859
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
the Second Circuit also determined that the company did not make
public performances by enabling the system to transmit reproduced
content to subscribers. Cablevision offered two grounds to support
this conclusion. First, under the same rationale that convinced the
court that the customers used the RS-DVR system to make the
reproductions, the company argued that customers, and not
Cablevision, made the transmissions.74 Cablevision also argued that,
in any event, the transmissions were not "to the public" and thus did
not violate the copyright owners' public performance rights no matter
who transmitted them.7 5  The court ultimately agreed that the
transmissions were not made to the public and, hence, determined
that it did not have to address the question of who was responsible for
making those transmissions.76 Therefore, it solely considered whether
the operation of the system resulted in transmissions to the public.
The district court had determined that Cablevision's RS-DVR
system made transmissions to the public because it transmitted the
same content to different customers at different times. In its view,
these conditions meant that the operation fell squarely within the
statutory language of a public performance.77 The Court of Appeals,
though, disagreed with the lower court's analysis. According to the
Second Circuit, the most sensible interpretation of the transmit clause
is that the relevant asynchronous transmissions must be from the
same copy of the copyrighted content.78 This is why the transmissions
in Redd Horne and On Command were deemed public performances.
In contrast, each of Cablevision's transmissions derives from a unique
and encrypted copy created by the customer and sent exclusively to
that customer's cable box.79 According to the Second Circuit, the use
of a unique copy limits the potential audience of a transmission and
thus is relevant in determining whether a transmission is to the
public.80  The court held, "[b]ecause each RS-DVR playback
transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy
produced by that subscriber, we conclude that such transmissions are
not performances 'to the public' and therefore do not infringe any
74. Id. at 134.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 135 (citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
78. See id. at 138-39. Some scholars disagree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Malkan, The Public Performance Right Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
89 OR. L. REV. 505, 535-46 (2010).
79. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 138.
80. See id.
860 [Vol. 17:4:845
2015] RIGHT NOTES FOR DISH 861
exclusive right of public performance."81  The court thus granted
summary judgment in favor of Cablevision.82
IV. AEREO PERFORMS POORLY IN THE WAKE OF THE CABLEVISION
DECISION
Using the Second Circuit's reasoning in Cartoon Network as a
springboard, Aereo devised a system-enabling it to store and stream
live over-the-air broadcasts at the request of customers-that it
believed was so analogous to Cablevision's RS-DVR that it would not
infringe on copyright owners' exclusive rights to publicly perform their
works.83 In very general terms, Aereo allocated to each customer a
unique antenna on its property that received live, over-the-air
television programming. The system then gave the customers
complete control to select programming that they wanted to have
transmitted over the Internet from the antenna to a personal
electronic viewing device located in an area within the range of the
original live over-the-air signal.84
To be more specific, Aereo's system consisted of thousands of
small dime-sized antennas housed in a facility suitably located to
receive over-the-air television signals. When an Aereo customer
wanted to watch a live television broadcast, he or she would select the
program from a list of current local programming on Aereo's website.
Aereo's server would then dedicate a particular antenna to that
customer for the duration of the show and tune it to the selected
81. Id. at 139. But see Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC,
915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (involving a company that retransmitted over-the-air
signals from independent small antennas with technology similar to Aereo's, although the
content was transmitted to regions not reached by the original over-the-air signals). In affirming
a preliminary injunction, the court disagreed with the analysis in Cartoon Network, claiming
that its "focus on the uniqueness of the individual copy from which [the] transmission is made is
not commanded by the statute." Id. at 1144-45. The court concluded that the "[diefendants'
unique-copy transmission argument based on Cablevision . . . is not binding in the Ninth
Circuit." Id. at 1146.
82. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139.
83. The Second Circuit agreed with Aereo that the company did not publicly perform
copyrighted works based on the reasoning of Cartoon Network because the system made a unique
copy of the program from a user-specific antenna and transmitted the performance to only one
Aereo customer. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689-94 (2d Cir. 2013), reud
sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
84. For information about the geographical range of Aereo's transmissions, see Brief of
36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 20 n.2, 27, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348474, and
Tristan Louis, Aereo: The Future of TV Is Here Today, FORTUNE (Apr. 13, 2013, 7:01 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tristanlouis/2013/04/13/aereo-the-future-of-tv-is-here-today/. Neither
the majority nor dissent in Aereo discussed the geographical restrictions because the range of the
original transmission was not relevant to either side's theory of liability for infringing the public
performance right.
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program.8 5 Notably, when the customer finished accessing the show,
the antenna would be reallocated to another individual subscriber,
who could then use it to receive its desired program. After selecting a
particular program, a customer was given a choice. He or she could
either request that the program be immediately streamed over the
Internet to a personal device or instruct the system to save the
program in a storage space dedicated to that customer so that it could
be streamed at a later time. The parties did not ask the court to
address whether the saved programs satisfied the conditions of fair
use,86 but, under Cartoon Network's logic, the answer presumably
would depend on the legality of the transmissions themselves.8 7
The debate in the litigation essentially came down to one's
conceptualization of the operation of the system. In Aereo's view,
customers used uniquely allocated personal antennas located at
Aereo's facility to retrieve publicly available, over-the-air television
signals and then transmitted the programs to their own personal
devices, typically so that they could watch them in private settings.8 8
Aereo's contribution to this process was entirely mechanical; it merely
established a system and left it to the customers to operate it, just as
Netcom did.89 Moreover, although customers could use the system
unlawfully, such as by transmitting the programs to a public forum,
Aereo's purpose was to facilitate private performances, and certainly a
85. The program was temporarily saved in a buffer file and transmitted to the customer
a few seconds after the live broadcast to the viewer. If two or more customers requested to view
the same show, Aereo would create separate buffer files for each customer and transmit the
shows to the customers from their unique files. This distinguishes the circumstances from
previous systems, such as Zediva's, in which transmissions were made from the same copy of the
copyrighted work. The Supreme Court did not address whether the temporary copies that were
made for the purpose of the transmissions satisfied the fair use criteria, presumably because it
found the purpose of making the copies to be infringing.
86. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
87. If the customers have a legitimate right to access the broadcasts for live viewing,
then they should be able to instruct Aereo's system to save them in a personal storage file for
time-shifting. In Cartoon Network, the court determined that Cablevision could mechanically
make unique personal copies at the customers' direction of programming that the customers had
legal rights to receive. The situation with Aereo logically is no different if the customers have
legal rights to access and transmit the programs. On the other hand, if Aereo's customers do not
have such access rights, then Aereo would be making the copies for a commercial objective that
would harm the market value of the copyrighted works. Thus, making the reproductions would
not satisfy the criteria of fair use. Cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (MP3.com's act of copying CDs for transmission to established CD owners not a
fair use because of commercial purpose and negative market effects).
88. Brief for Respondent at 28-30, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL
1245459.
89. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504; Brief for Respondent, supra note 88, at 28.
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substantial number of customers used it in that way.90 Thus, Aereo
could not be liable for direct infringement of the public performance
right.9 1 On the other hand, from the copyright owners' perspective,
Aereo, and not the customer, captured specific over-the-air television
signals on its property and then retransmitted those signals to
numerous unrelated people at many different locations over the
Internet.92  In this way, Aereo's actions fell squarely within the
statutory definition of a public performance.
Despite Aereo developing a complex system that appeared to be
under the complete control of customers, who used personal antennas
to receive over-the-air broadcasts and then instructed the system to
retransmit those broadcasts, the Supreme Court determined that
Aereo's behind-the-scenes technological devices nonetheless failed to
make it any different than a traditional cable provider.93 The Court
reached this conclusion after evaluating both the history of the public
performance definition under the Copyright Act and the reasons that
Congress amended that definition in 1976.
Prior to 1976, the Copyright Act gave copyright owners the
exclusive right to perform dramatic works publicly and to perform
nondramatic and musical compositions publicly for profit.9 4 Based on
these provisions, in 1968, the Supreme Court held that community
antenna television (CATV) systems did not perform copyrighted works
by retransmitting over-the-air copyrighted broadcasts to customers
within a local geographical area.95 The Court reasoned that since the
CATV customers could legally use amplifying equipment to access the
over-the-air signals, the CATV company did nothing wrong by, in
90. See WNET, 712 F.3d at 690 (stating that the potential audience of each Aereo
transmission is the single user who requested the program); Brief for Respondent, supra note 88,
at 28, (stating that Aereo believes that no actor that uses its system directly infringes).
91. See WNET, 712 F.3d at 696 ("Aereo's transmissions of unique copies of broadcast
television programs created at its users' requests and transmitted while the programs are still
airing on broadcast television are not 'public performances' of the Plaintiffs' copyrighted works.").
92. See, e.g., Brief of Screen Actors Guild et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 880972.
93. In reaching this conclusion, some of the Justices at oral arguments seemed to
philosophically agree with a dissenter's view from the Court of Appeals decision, who called
Aereo's approach a "Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the
reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the law." WNET, 712
F.3d at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Katy Bachman, Supreme Court Weighs Whether Aereo
Is Simply Circumventing Copyright Law, ADWEEK (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/
news/technology/supreme-court-weighs-whether-aereo-simply-circumventing-copyright-law-
157181.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(e) (1964) (repealed 1976).
95. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968).
The Supreme Court, in Aereo, called CATV systems the precursors of modern cable systems. See
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
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essence, providing that equipment for the benefit of those customers.96
In 1974, the Court reached the same conclusion for CATV providers
servicing customers that lived hundreds of miles away.97 This time,
the Court held that the CATV provider did not perform the works
because it only chose the broadcast stations, and not the actual
copyrighted works, that it provided to customers.98 Thus, the rulings
established that once a broadcaster puts a signal into the public
airwaves, anyone was free to facilitate viewing by members of the
public.99
According to the Court in Aereo, Congress overruled these
decisions in 1976 by amending the Copyright Act with the language
that is still in effect today.10 0 The Court determined that under the
new public performance clause, entities that act like CATV systems,
including modern cable systems, publicly perform copyrighted works,
even when they simply enhance viewers' ability to receive broadcast
television stations.10 1 In the Court's view, this is exactly what Aereo
was doing, although in a new technological way; therefore, it held that
the public performance clause covered its operation. Without saying
so directly, the Court clearly believed that Aereo was engaged in a
clever trick and warned that, if it got away with it, all cable companies
would quickly adopt the new delivery method to avoid paying
copyright royalties, thereby thwarting Congress's intent when it
passed the legislation.102 In response, the dissenters criticized the
majority for condemning Aereo simply through "guilt by resemblance,"
with reasoning based on the shakiest of foundations.03
The Court majority reached the right conclusion but, as the
dissent noted, never directly established a coherent theoretical
conceptualization to back it up even though some of its reasoning
alludes to a proper framework. As mentioned, before 1976, the
governing model of an over-the-air transmission was that it was one
bulk public signal-a grand performance made to the public, so to
speak-that anyone was free to view or assist others to view. The
1976 amendments, however, changed the scenario from a public model
to a private geographic control approach that treats an over-the-air
transmission as conceptually divided into multiple signals that arrive
separately and uniquely at each location that they touch and are
96. See Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 399-400.
97. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 400, 412 (1974).
98. See id. at 407-10.
99. See id. at 408.
100. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2505.
101. See id. at 2506.
102. See id. at 2509.
103. See id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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exclusively acquired by the owner or controlling occupant of that
property (hereinafter called "the authorized recipient").10 4 This means
that if an authorized recipient of a broadcast signal on property A
retransmits the signal to property B, then the transmission to
property B is a performance even if the occupant of property B could
have received the same original broadcast via an antenna on his roof.
Also, if the authorized recipient on property A retransmits its signal to
one or more locations so that the content can be viewed by unrelated
members of the public, then that person publicly performs the
underlying work.10  Taken together, this explains why cable
companies, for instance, need permission from copyright owners to
carry programming that is also aired on local broadcast television
stations.10 6
However, once the copyright owner authorizes the
retransmission of the signal from property A to another particular
geographic location, the authorized recipient at that other location
obtains legitimate access to the copyrighted content encoded in the
signal.107 That authorized recipient then performs, or displays, the
work by showing the content on his property or retransmitting the
signal to another location where individuals view the material.0 8
Assuming only family and friends watch the program on the property,
then the performance is private, but if a larger audience views it, then
it becomes public.109 And if the authorized recipient retransmits the
signal to other locations, or lets others transmit that signal, then he or
104. A controlling occupant of property would be someone who the property owner has
authorized to access and exercise substantial control over the property. For instance, one who
rents an apartment or automobile under typical terms would be controlling occupants.
105. If the authorized recipient allows an unauthorized recipient to access and
retransmit the signal from its property, then the transmission will be treated as if the authorized
recipient sent it. This is effectively what Aereo did when it allocated antennas on its property to
its subscribers. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
106. Cable systems and satellite carriers may obtain permission to retransmit
copyrighted content through private negotiations or through a compulsory license. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 111(a)(4), (c), 119 (2012).
107. Cf. Brief of Dish Network L.L.C. & Echostar Technologies L.L.C. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 42-46, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1348475
(stating that once a transmission crosses the physical boundary of the subscriber's door or the
legal boundary established by the licensing framework, the particular public performance comes
to an end). With a cable system, the authorized recipient is the subscriber at the location that
houses the cable box.
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (stating that under the new
copyright language, both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program perform).
109. See § 101 (defining a public performance as one made at a place open to the public
or where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its special
acquaintances is gathered).
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she may be making public performances, depending on the set of
people who view the content.110
The geographic control approach clearly distinguishes the
circumstances in Cartoon Network from those in Aereo. In Cartoon
Network, the copyright holders authorized Cablevision to transmit
performances to customers in exchange for royalties. At that point,
the customers gained legitimate access to the performances, and so,
under Netcom's principles, Cablevision could provide equipment that
mechanically followed the directions of those customers to make
personal copies of those performances and transmit them without
incurring direct liability. In contrast, the copyright holders never
authorized Aereo to transmit performances from its facility to
customers; therefore, Aereo was the only party that had legal access to
those performances. The fact that Aereo designated temporary
antennas to individual customers did not make the customers
authorized recipients of the performance signals. For that to be the
case, Aereo, at a minimum, would have had to allocate specific
antennas to each subscriber through rental agreements that provided
them rights to exercise substantial physical control over their
particular assets.
The actual situation in Aereo, of course, was drastically
different. In fact, Aereo not only failed to provide its customers any
kind of physical control over the company's antenna assets but also
did not even exclusively allocate particular antennas to individual
customers. Rather, it simply allowed customers to use antennas on its
property that were available for the duration of the shows that they
wanted to watch.111 Thus, in reality, Aereo simply received the
broadcast signals that the copyright owners sent to its property and
then made those signals available to the public through an integrated
web of antennas.112
110. A public performance would result, for instance, if the transmission is (1) sent to a
public facility where it is viewed by occupants, (2) sent to a place where it is viewed by a larger
set of people than a normal circle of family and friends, or (3) sent to several locations that
include people other than a normal circle of family and friends. See id. The Copyright
Act provides certain specific circumstances in which a public performance does not
infringe copyrights. See § 111. For instance, one exception allows the management of a hotel,
apartment, or similar facility to retransmit over-the-air signals to guests or residents at no
charge. See § 111(a)(1).
111. This process of increasing efficiency by transferring limited antenna resources to
different customers based on current needs is reminiscent of the system used by Zediva. With
Zediva, different members of the public shared the same DVD, while with Aereo, different
members of the public shared the same antenna. See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys.,
Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("[Zediva] customers do not have access to or
control over a specific DVD or DVD player.").
112. Even if Aereo provided each subscriber the exclusive use of one particular antenna,
it still would make public performances by allowing several unrelated customers access to the
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A majority of the Court clearly agreed with the geographic
control model but did not directly identify it in their opinion. For
instance, the majority determined that the customers were not
making personal transmissions from Aereo to their devices because,
"neither the record nor Aereo suggests that Aereo's subscribers receive
performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the
underlying works."" 3  The Court continued that "an entity that
transmits a performance to individuals in their capacities as owners or
possessors does not perform to 'the public,' whereas an entity like
Aereo that transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who lack
any prior relationship to the works does so perform."114 Thus, the
Court majority did recognize that Aereo's customers did not gain
legitimate access to broadcast signals acquired on Aereo's property via
temporary personal antennas.
Aereo could have appropriately followed the Cablevision model
if it had designed the system to use the subscribers' own antennas,
located on the subscribers' premises to receive the signals. The
customers then could have instructed Aereo's system to transmit those
signals back to Aereo and save the signals in personal storage space
dedicated to that customer or retransmit those signals to a customer's
personal viewing device over the Internet. Of course, with this setup,
the customers might not enjoy the same quality of reception as they
could get via the antennas located on Aereo's well-situated property,
but, as noted in the discussion of the On Command hotel video system,
copyrights are intended to provide certain incentives related to
convenience."' Still, with this system, they could save their lawfully
accessed programs on a remote DVR and watch them on a personal
viewing device other than the television.
The three dissenting judges in Aereo, unfortunately, fell for the
smokescreen raised by Aereo and its amicus curiae supporters, who
clouded the analysis with faulty arguments about volitional
programs, or the signals containing the programs, from its property. This would be no different
than a public facility that shows the same program on multiple screens, which are each hooked
up to its own separate antenna. The facility performs or displays the works publicly, even if the
customers are given complete control to select the channels that they wish to watch on the
facility's individual sets, since the performances are made available "at a place open to the
public." § 101. Indeed, based on the logic ofAveco, the facility would perform the works publicly
even if each television was housed in a private room that could only be occupied by a few friends
or family members. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 62-63 (3d Cir.
1986); infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
113. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510.
114. Id.
115. For discussion of On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F.
Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991), see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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conduct.116  The dissent believed that Aereo simply provided a
mechanical system and made it available to customers, who then
could use it for legal or illegal ends.117 According to the dissent, the
broadcasters, not Aereo, chose the content that was available on its
system.18 Thus, the operation lacked the kinds of human interactions
and decisions required by video-on-demand services, such as
Netflix.119 The dissent also noted that Aereo did not choose the
content that was transmitted from its facility to customers, since the
customers made these selections themselves.120 For this reason, Aereo
did not have the necessary volitional conduct to hold it directly
responsible for the transmissions.12 ' Rather, the customers were the
impetus behind them and, accordingly, only the customers should be
held accountable for direct infringements, such as when they transmit
the programs to public settings. Aereo, on the other hand, could only
be liable as a contributory infringer, which depends on other factors,
such as its knowledge about specific public performances and an
ability to prevent them.122
The dissent supported its conclusion by relying on the
traditional analogies to operators of copy machines that rent them on
116. See, e.g., Brief of 36 Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 84; Brief of Computer & Communications Industry
Ass'n & Mozilla Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)
(No. 13-461), 2014 WL 1319386; Brief of Dish Network L.L.C. & Echostar Technologies L.L.C.,
supra note 107. Several authors of law review articles also have taken positions supporting
Aereo's claim that it did not publicly perform copyrighted works. See, e.g., Krista Consiglio, Note,
Aereo and FilmOn: Technology's Latest Copyright War and Why Aereo Should Survive, 71 WASH
& LEE L. REV. 2557 (2014); Jacob Marshall, Note, Trading Rabbit Ears for Wi-Fi: Aereo, the
Public Performance Right, and How Broadcasters Want to Control the Business of Internet TV, 16
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 909 (2014).
117. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 2513 ("[S]election and arrangement [of content by video-on-demand
services] constitutes a volitional act directed to specific copyrighted works and thus serves as a
basis for direct liability.").
120. See id. at 2514 (stating that with Aereo's system, "subscribers call all the shots").
121. See id. at 2513 ("Most of the time that issue [of direct infringement] will come down
to who selects the copyrighted content: the defendant or its customers.").
122. See id. at 2514, 2517. Contributory infringement is established where the
defendant, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir. 1971). In Netcom, the court indicated that an ISP could be
liable for contributory infringement if it had knowledge that specific customers were using its
system to infringe copyrights and it had the ability to prevent them. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-line Commc'ns, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995). One also can be held
responsible for contributory infringement by providing the tools used for infringement and
encouraging customers to use them for those illegal ends. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
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a per-use basis to customers.123 Specifically, it claimed that Aereo was
akin to a copy shop that provides its patrons a library card (the
antenna), which enabled them to obtain freely available broadcasted
content.124 The customers use the card to choose the content and then
instruct the system to take the potentially infringing action. In either
case, the operator is passive and, so, does not have the requisite
volitional conduct to be held directly accountable.125
Although this sounds coherent and consistent, the dissent's
reliance on the copy shop analogy is completely misplaced. First of all,
Aereo's customers did not come to Aereo with their own independently
acquired materials, whether they were obtained from a public library
or elsewhere. Rather, Aereo gave them access to copyrighted
materials on its property that Aereo, as the property owner, had no
right to show or transmit to the public. In effect, Aereo gave the
copyrighted content to individuals and had them do what the company
would not have been allowed to do itself. Hence, in reality, the
customers acted more like agents of Aereo who collectively
participated in a scheme that resulted in public performances of the
copyrighted materials under the umbrella of the company. The
volitional conduct, therefore, occurred when Aereo chose to give
subscribers access to content that it had no right to offer.
Even allowing for the dissent's copy shop analogy, the library
card concept is clearly not the right model. Rather, Aereo was more
like a CD rental shop that makes CD burners available within the
shop. Since it is unlawful for commercial businesses to rent CDs to
customers due to the likelihood that they will make infringing
reproductions,12 6 it follows that the CD shop should also be directly
responsible when the customers use its machines to accomplish that
illegal end.127 Sure, the customers select the content and work the
machines, but the copy shop was not allowed to give them the content
for the reproduction in the first place. This certainly is much closer to
what Aereo did than hypothetically providing its customers a library
card to access publicly available content.
123. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513.
124. See id. at 2514.
125. See id.
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2012) (preventing the rental of sound recordings or
computer programs by commercial interests despite the first sale doctrine). For an explanation of
the purposes behind this provision, see, for example, STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 174-75 (2009).
127. As discussed earlier, direct liability arises when the machine owner engages in
illegal conduct with a sufficient nexus to the copying that it is appropriate to conclude that the
machine owner trespassed on the domain of the copyright owner. See supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
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In truth, though, the copy shop analogy does not depict the
appropriate counterpart in the physical world. Rather, it is more
accurate to compare Aereo to a facility that receives all the
over-the-air television signals on its property and then links numerous
televisions to separate antennas on the roof. As part of its service,
Aereo provides its customers telescopic viewing tubes that allow them
to zero-in and view designated screens at Aereo's facility, which they
can tune to the channels they want to watch from their homes. As
with Aereo's technical system, the broadcasters make the programs
available and the customers select the content. Yet, it should be
obvious that Aereo has done nothing more than create a public
viewing facility very much like the one in Aveco, which the court
determined was a direct infringer.128 One could also analogize to a
very large sports bar where all the patrons are watching their favorite
teams on numerous individual televisions in private rooms within the
facility. 129 No one would question that the bar is making public
performances, and the same conclusion obviously applies to Aereo.130
The dissent laments that the Court majority "provides no
criteria for determining when its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies."131
It then questions whether Aereo might legally offer other
arrangements that are not like cable TV, such as a
customer-controlled delayed transmission service, because cable TV
only provides live television.132 If the Court had definitively made its
decision in terms of geographic control attributes, then the dissent
would not have had the opportunity to sarcastically wonder what the
outcome to its hypothetical worry would be, since the service would
certainly be illegal.133  Using this straightforward approach also
cleanly disarms one of the latest copyright salvos that Fox
Communications has dropped on Dish Network's new array of
services, which it incorrectly claims is supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Aereo.134
128. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63-64 (3d Cir. 1986).
129. As made clear in Aveco, On Command, and Redd Horne, it does not matter if the
patrons in the sports bar watch the programming within one large open room or in individual
private viewing areas, as long as the overall facility is open to the public.
130. Some public facilities, including sports bars, may be subject to an exception that
allows them to show live television programs, depending on their physical size, the number and
size of the televisions, whether they serve food or drink, and as long as they do not charge
customers to watch the programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012).
131. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2516 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 2516-17.
133. Since the customers would not have lawful access to the signals received on Aereo's
property, Aereo would be responsible for making reproductions on DVRs or performing the works
publicly when the signals are transmitted to viewers.
134. See Avery, supra note 6.
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V. Fox MAY BEAT DISH SOMEWHERE BUT NOT DISH ANYWHERE
Recently, Dish Network has introduced many new
technological innovations that allow its subscribers to watch programs
carried by Dish in more convenient ways.135  In response, Fox
Broadcasting has taken aim at several of these, asking federal courts
in California to enjoin the services on the grounds that they infringe
its copyrights and violate contractual provisions.136 In particular, Fox
is upset with: (1) Prime Time Anytime, which allows subscribers to
automatically save all prime time programming aired by four
networks on a home DVR; (2) AutoHop, which allows subscribers to
easily skip commercials from the Prime Time Anytime programs; (3)
Dish Anywhere, which allows subscribers to watch Dish Channels live
on personal devices; and (4) Hopper Transfers, which allows
subscribers to copy Dish programming on personal devices as long as
they remain customers of Dish. To Fox's dismay, the California
district court refused to issue a preliminary injunction for any of these
services, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed those orders.137 Thereafter,
in January 2015, the district court granted Dish's motions for
summary judgment on the copyright claims.138 Thus, Fox faces an
uphill battle if it is to get relief from the courts.139 As we shall see,
some of the services may indeed raise difficult copyright issues that
could be tough for the courts to ultimately tackle. However, despite
Fox's attempt to tar it with the same brush as Aereo, Dish Anywhere
is the application that is easiest to defend in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling.
135. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Dish Takes Aim at the Cable Bundle, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 2015, at A13. In addition to the services discussed in this section, Dish also recently
unveiled Sling TV, an Internet streaming service that delivers content with the authority of
participating networks, such as ESPN, CNN, TNT, and TBS, among others, to Internet devices
for twenty dollars per month. For more information on the service, see SLING TELEVISION,
https://www.sling.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
136. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187499, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013); Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC,
905 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff'd 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). Fox owns the
copyrights to several of the shows that it airs, such as The Simpsons and Family Guy. The
contract claims are not discussed in this article.
137. See Fox, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187499 at *2-8; Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1092-96.
138. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *40-41 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015).
139. There is significant speculation that the parties will now settle the litigation. See,
e.g., Eric Gardner, Fox, Dish Agree to Pause Litigation over Ad-Shipping DVR, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/fox-dish-agree-pause-litigation-
764331.
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A. Prime Time Anytime
With Prime Time Anytime, customers can push a button that,
by default, records all prime time programming on all of the four
major networks and saves those programs for eight days on the
at-home DVR system provided by Dish.140 After activating the button,
the subscribers are provided a menu through which they can disable
recordings of particular networks on specified days of the week and
can reduce the time that programs are saved.141 Subscribers also have
the option to save a broadcasted program for a longer period of time by
instructing the system to copy the show from the DVR disk space
allocated for Prime Time Anytime programming to the DVR disk folder
otherwise used to save content. With Prime Time Anytime, Dish made
certain predetermined automatic choices, such as fully recording
shows that were at least half completed by the end of the prime time
window and altering the prime time window during special events,
such as the Olympics.
Fox argues that by preselecting certain options, Dish is
engaged in volitional conduct and should be directly liable as a
commercial establishment for making unauthorized reproductions of
its copyrighted content.142  As with so many new technological
innovations, including Aereo, the notion of volitional conduct rears its
ugly head and becomes the determining factor between legal and
illegal conduct. If Dish does not have volition, then it is only subject to
contributory liability, which in this instance insulates it from
wrongdoing.143 Unlike with Aereo, though, Dish's customers actually
140. The networks are NBC, ABC, CBS, and Fox. Prime time programming typically is
8:00-11:00 PM Eastern Standard Time and Pacific Standard Time, and 7:00-10:00 PM
Mountain Standard Time and Central Standard Time.
141. The customer has the option to save shows for two to eight days.
142. Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1099-102. If Dish is found directly liable, it is very unlikely
that it could benefit from a fair use defense, even assuming that most customers time-shift the
recorded programs, because it has a commercial purpose and does not transform the copyrighted
content. For a similar scenario, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349,
352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding MP3.com did not have a fair use for reproducing music, even
though customers used the service to listen to music that they had already purchased on CDs).
143. Since the system is devised to save programs for fewer than eight days, then
customers will make a substantial number of recordings for time-shifting, which is a fair use. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984). The provider of
technology typically is not liable for contributory infringement when there are substantial
current or potential noninfringing uses of the technology and the provider has no ability to
prevent illegal uses by customers. See id. at 442; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line
Commc'ns, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995). This is qualified when the provider's
purpose is clearly to facilitate infringement, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005), but that does not apply to Dish because it actively limits the
recording times to a period typically associated with personal time-shifting, which is a lawful fair
use.
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have lawful access to the copyrighted content; therefore, the
arguments raised in the Aereo dissent provide legal cover to Dish's
operations. Dish has provided a totally automated user-controlled
system for which the customers choose the content.144 In contrast
with On Command, where the hotel selected and loaded videotapes
into its own machines and simply transmitted the movies to guests
without giving them any control over the playback functions, Dish is
doing nothing more than facilitating actions, at its customers'
discretion, that the customers already could choose to do with content
that the copyright owners had previously authorized them to view.
In addition, the dissent's appeal to the copy shop analogy
provides especially useful insights, since the accusation involves
reproduction and not performance.145 Indeed, the wrongdoing that
Fox accuses Dish of committing is like identifying a copy shop owner
who preselects certain parameters of the machine, such as paper size
and orientation, which can be changed by users via a menu of choices.
Clearly, predetermining these options for the convenience of
consumers does not give rise to volitional conduct, and the same can
be said for how Dish set up Prime Time Anytime. This is why the
district court and Ninth Circuit both concluded that Fox had not
established a likelihood of success on the merits in the infringement
suit and, consequently, refused to issue a preliminary injunction.146 It
also explains why the district court then granted Dish's motion for
summary judgment.147 Even based on the evaluation of volitional
conduct by the dissenting Supreme Court justices in Aereo, this
conclusion is unquestionably correct.
B. AutoHop
The debate over the AutoHop feature, which allows viewers to
effectively skip over commercials, raises more difficult issues that
cannot be resolved by reference to the Aereo decision.148 To create
AutoHop capabilities, Dish employees watch Prime Time Anytime
programming the night they are aired and create a file that marks the
144. According to the dissent in Aereo, the most important factor in addressing volitional
conduct is "who selects the copyrighted content." Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498,
2513 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See id.
146. See Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1102, 1111, affd 747 F.3d at 1068, 1073.
147. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *56-61 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015).
148. Although the controversy over AutoHop is outside the direct scope of this Article, it
is important to acknowledge the parameters of the debate to give context to the breadth of the
disputes that separate the parties.
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beginning and end of commercials.149 This file is transmitted to
customer DVR boxes the next morning and allows subscribers to "hop
over" commercials from the Prime Time Anytime programming that
they reproduced on their DVRs the night before. The original copies of
the entire programs remain unaffected and users can watch the
commercials if they wish. AutoHop simply instructs the DVR where to
stop and restart the content.50
Since Dish does not make the reproductions of the copyrighted
programming, Dish can only be liable for distributing the
commercial-skipping files if the company acts as a contributory
infringer. The Supreme Court determined in Sony that individuals
are able to legally make temporary copies of television programming
for the purposes of time-shifting because the reproductions are a fair
use.151 Thus, if you look at the glass one way, AutoHop is simply a tool
that customers can apply to prevent them from viewing portions of
legally reproduced content. In this way, it does not implicate any
copyright privileges, just as providing eyeshades would not. In fact,
Congress has demonstrated that it approves of technologies that
automatically skip preselected content with the passage of the Family
Movie Act, which sanctions the distribution of filters that edit content
during the playback of movies.152
On the other hand, when customers are provided with
AutoHop's capabilities, then they may be motivated to make copies on
their DVRs with Prime Time Anytime not simply for time-shifting, but
also, or even primarily, so that they can watch their favorite prime
time shows without commercials. This, in turn, may result in far
more damaging market effects on the copyright owners than the
consequences from mere time-shifting, thereby decreasing the
potential applicability of fair use protection.
149. The California district court provides a complete explanation of AutoHop's
operation. See Fox, 905 F. Supp. 2d at 1094-96.
150. Dish also makes copies of the copyrighted broadcasts to test the accuracy of the
AutoHop file markers. The district court determined that these "quality assurance" copies are
not protected as fair use, but did not issue a preliminary injunction because Fox did not
sufficiently demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm. See id. at 1102-06, 1109-11. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish
Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2014).
151. The Supreme Court's decision only evaluated copies of free over-the-air
programming, but copyright owners have not challenged copies of content distributed by cable or
satellite for the purpose of time-shifting. For instance, the copyright owners did not sue
Cablevision for contributory infringement. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d
121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
152. The Family Movie Act was a component of the Family Entertainment and Copyright
Act of 2005, which was signed by President Bush on April 27, 2005. Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, §§ 201-02, 119 Stat. 218, 223-24 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(11) (2012)).
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At the preliminary injunction stage, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that Fox did not own the copyrights to the commercials and therefore
had no copyright interests in the material skipped by customers.153
Later, the district court found that Fox did, indeed, own the copyrights
to some of the commercials, but nonetheless ruled that AutoHop was
legal, since ad-skipping does not involve unauthorized copying or
distribution.15 4 As just noted, one might take issue with this
conclusion because the customer's initial copy may not be a fair use
when made for the purpose of skipping advertisements. Also, even if
Fox does not own the copyright to the advertisements, it still might
have copyright interests in compilations, which include the union of
its copyrighted programs with the advertising content.55 If this were
the case, then reproductions made for the purpose of removing
portions of that content, even if developed by others, might then
diminish the economic value of Fox's entire copyrighted compilation.15 6
C. Dish Anywhere
Dish Anywhere provides subscribers with significant flexibility
to remotely watch live or recorded programs anywhere in the world
using technology called a "Sling" that streams content from
audiovisual equipment via the Internet.15 7 Along with its DVR
153. See Fox, 747 F.3d at 1068-69. According to the court, "commercial-skipping does not
implicate Fox's copyright interest because Fox owns the copyrights to the television programs,
not to the ads aired in the commercial breaks. If recording an entire copyrighted program is a
fair use, the fact that viewers do not watch the ads not copyrighted by Fox cannot transform the
recording into a copyright violation." Id.
154. See Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *72-74 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015).
155. For Fox to have rights to the compilation, it must exercise creativity in the selection
and arrangement of its copyrighted work and the commercials that are aired with it. See, e.g.,
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
CIRCULAR 14, COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS (stating that compilations of
preexisting works may be copyrightable if the materials are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
ways that demonstrate originality).
156. Cf. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that
making copies for the purpose of fast-forwarding through commercials amounts to creating an
unauthorized derivative work).
157. Sling Media owns federal trademark registrations to the word "Sling" as applied to
a variety of hardware, software, and services associated with the streaming of audio and video
content to network devices. SLING, Registration No. 3,719,986; SLING, Registration No.
3,851,688. Sling Media became well known for introducing the Slingbox, which is used to stream
live television to remote devices via the Internet. EchoStar, the satellite company that also
operated Dish Network, acquired Sling Media in 2007. See Laura Holson, EchoStar to Acquire
Sling Media, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2007). Soon thereafter, EchoStar spun off Sling Media and its
other set-top box businesses to a new company called EchoStar Holding Corporation. The parent
company, which then primarily consisted of the satellite TV broadcasting business, changed its
name to Dish Network Corporation. See Erica Org, EchoStar Now Called Dish Network Spins Off
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capabilities, Dish's home configurations include several separate
tuners as well as a Sling.15 8 Since Dish provides more than one tuner,
individuals within the house can use a home network to watch
different programs on separate televisions, while someone else can use
the Sling to watch a live broadcast from another location using a
personal viewer with Internet access, such as an iPad, smart phone, or
laptop.15 9 The Sling also allows an individual to stream any program
that was previously saved on the DVR to a remote personal device via
an Internet connection.
In September 2013, the district court, without addressing the
likelihood of success on the copyright claim, refused to issue a
preliminary injunction because Fox had not demonstrated irreparable
harm.160 In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Fox reportedly asked the
court to reconsider this ruling in light of the Supreme Court's Aereo
decision, claiming in its brief that Dish "engages in virtually identical
conduct when it streams Fox's programming to Dish subscribers over
the Internet . . . ."161 The Ninth Circuit, though, affirmed the ruling of
the district court on the irreparable harm issue in July 2014.162
Subsequently, the district court granted Dish's motion for summary
judgment.163
Although Fox may have legitimate contract claims regarding
Dish Anywhere, it will undoubtedly fail with its allegations that the
service violates public performance rights, despite its recent victory in
Aereo.164 Drawing from the Aereo decision, Fox undoubtedly believes
Sling Media, CNET (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.cnet.com/news/echostar-now-called-dish-network-
spins-off-sling-media/.
158. The main set-top box includes three separate tuners, but customers can add more
tuners for use with home networking systems using devices called "Super Joeys."
159. The home network may be supported by Super Joeys, which include additional
tuners that allow individuals within the home to simultaneously watch even more channels and
record them to the DVR.
160. See Fox Broad. Co., Inc. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187499, at *25-26 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2013).
161. Avery, supra note 6; see Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, No. CV 12-04529
DMG(SHx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *30-31 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015) ("Fox contends
that the Supreme Court's recent decision in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc. is a game-changer that governs the outcome of it copyright claims in this case."); Cyrus
Farivar, Dish Anywhere Streaming Stays Alive, Despite Fox's Win Over Aereo, ARS TECHNICA
(July 14, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/07/dish-anywhere-streaming-stays-alive-
despite-foxs-win-over-aereo/.
162. See Fox Broad. Co., v. Dish Network LLC, 583 F. App'x. 618, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2014).
163. See Fox, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *40-41.
164. Fox claims that Dish violates the Retransmission Consent Agreement, which among
other things, contains a prohibition on authorizing others to retransmit Fox broadcasts. Fox
Broad. Co. v. Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014); Fox, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 187499, at *8-11. In 2015, the district court denied both parties' motions for summary
judgment. See Fox, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *55.
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that Dish is behaving like a cable company by transmitting the same
programming to multiple individuals without paying additional
license fees. Specifically, Fox wants the courts to recognize that, even
though Dish Anywhere appears to give customers autonomy over the
content, Dish is making public performances through its rented
machinery that simultaneously transmits the same programs from
set-top boxes to viewers around the world. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court invited this meritless argument by failing to articulate
the geographic control foundation in the Aereo ruling.
In reality, the differences between Aereo and Dish Anywhere
are striking, when considering geographic control attributes. Aereo
provided its customers public access to copyrighted content on its
property without having authority to do so. Dish, on the other hand,
delivers content to set-top boxes controlled by its subscribers with
authority from copyright holders, including Fox. Thus, unlike Aereo,
Dish's role with its automated system is comparable to the operators
in Netcom and Cartoon Network, which mechanically followed
instructions to accomplish tasks on copyrighted materials that
customers already possessed or legally controlled.165 For this reason,
the notion of volitional conduct becomes much more relevant. In fact,
Dish's customers use Slings to transmit copyrighted content to devices
in other locations totally at their own bidding and without any active
involvement by Dish or its personnel. Thus, Dish can be directly
liable only if there are few noninfringing ways that customers can use
the Slings to transmit copyrighted content or if Dish's purpose is to
encourage customers to publicly perform copyrighted works.166
In this instance, each individual customer takes actions with
the separate signals that Dish transmits exclusively to the set-top box
under his control. Thus, the subscribers are not sharing signals and
165. In Netcom, customers used the system to copy and transmit materials that they
already possessed. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc'ns, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Netcom did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in copying
plaintiffs' works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby software
automatically forwards messages received from subscribers . . . ."). In Cartoon Network, the
customers had legal access to and the right to control the copyrighted works. Cartoon Network
LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court determined
that Cablevsion's RS-DVR system was sufficiently close to the operation of an ISP or copy shop-
where all copied content is supplied by the customers themselves-that he customers were the
people who made the copies when determining liability. See id.
166. Dish may violate its contracts with Fox by providing tools that enable customers to
transmit content to personal devices. This has no bearing on the determination about copyright
infringement, however. For instance, suppose a copy shop owner promised a book author that he
would stop customers from copying any portions of the book. If a customer copied a small portion
for research in a way that satisfied fair use, the copy shop owner would not become a copyright
infringer due to violation of the contract. Rather, the wrong would be totally within the realm of
contract principles.
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retransmitting content to different people from the same source. For
this reason, Dish Anywhere cannot be likened to Zediva or the On
Command hotel movie service. Rather, with Dish Anywhere, each
customer is transmitting independent content from a personal set-top
box or personal DVR to a device in another location. As long as that
transmission is not to a public facility or otherwise to the public, then
by the express terms of the Copyright Act, the transmission does not
violate a copyright owner's exclusive right to perform publicly.
Furthermore, if subscribers use Slings to retransmit live programming
to their own personal devices while they are away from home, then the
transmissions are private and noninfringing.167 Since this is certainly
a major, noninfringing way that subscribers use Slings, and Dish
markets the service for just this kind of convenience, Dish is not
subject to contributory liability just because some customers may use
their Slings in ways that amount to public performances.
Although Dish does not directly infringe public performance
rights through Dish Anywhere, some of the ways that customers might
use Slings could raise some interesting copyright issues. For instance,
suppose a Dish customer gives his Dish Anywhere password to a friend
who has not contracted with a cable or satellite company for television
services. Typically, an individual with only one set-top box who uses a
Sling to share live content with a friend must watch the same program
at home as the one transmitted to the associate. This, at least,
partially limits the freedom that the friend may have when the paying
subscriber is also watching TV. 168 However, since the Dish set-top box
has three tuners, the friend can watch anything available through the
subscription even while the subscriber is watching another program.
Also, the friend can watch programs that the subscriber previously
saved on the DVR while the subscriber watches live TV. 169 Thus, the
friend can essentially avoid paying fees to cable and satellite
companies and instead watch copyrighted content for free, even when
167. Although a customer that streams content from the DVR to a personal device does
not infringe public performance rights, it is possible that the initial reproduction would not be
considered a fair use if it were made for the purpose of watching the programming in another
location. The Supreme Court in Sony only addressed reproductions that were made for the
purpose of watching content at a later time at home. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984) (stating that the case concerned the private, home use of
video tape recorders). The Court determined that the activity was a fair use largely because the
copyright owners could not demonstrate any concrete financial harm. See id. at 450-54.
Copyright owners might be able to demonstrate greater market effects when customers make
copies at home for the purpose of watching the content at a different place via the Internet using
a Sling.
168. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, TV Viewers of the World, Unite: Finally Cutting Cable,
WALL ST. J., July 16, 2014, at D1.
169. See Fox, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 187499, at 3.
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the acquaintance is not within the location that is controlled by the
subscriber and houses the set-top box.
This, perhaps, is not what Congress anticipated when it revised
the definition of a public performance in 1976. The legality, though,
comes down to a statutory interpretation of the phrase "to the public."
As previously noted, the Supreme Court already concluded in Aereo
that the phrase is controlled by the definition of a "public place,"
noting that "an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not
transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its
social circle."170
This may seem like the wrong result; it may even
feel like stealing. Nevertheless, due to the Supreme Court's
interpretation, the legality of the practice is now firmly cemented,
unless Congress acts to change it. For instance, as mentioned earlier,
the notion of "to the public" could be more specifically defined to cover
all transmissions outside of the property to anyone other than the
subscriber or legal possessor of the copyrighted content.171 Although
such an approach would prohibit the suspect transmissions, it
nevertheless may be more limiting than appropriate. Instead, relying
on geographic control attributes, a better solution might be to reword
the phrase "to the public" so that it only applies to those who do not
reside at the location where the set-top box is situated. This typically
would allow children, spouses, or co-renters to access content that they
otherwise could view at home, but prevent other members of the
public from seeing those programs for free.
D. Hopper Transfers
The final point of contention involves Hopper Transfers, which
is a service that allows customers to copy recordings made on their
DVRs to mobile devices, such as an iPad, via a home wireless network.
By using this service, Dish subscribers can watch recorded programs
even when they do not have access to the Internet, such as when
travelling on a plane. Although at first glance one might think that
Hopper Transfers should be treated the same as Dish Anywhere, this
may not be the case. The Copyright Act specifically provides that
copyright owners do not have the right to prevent private
transmissions of displays or performances to other locations, which
protects many users of Dish Anywhere.172 Hopper Transfers, though,
170. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
171. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
172. The Copyright Act only provides copyright owners exclusive rights to perform or
display works publicly. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)-(5) (2012). Thus, subscribers who use Dish
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require reproductions of copyrighted material and, so, are infringing
unless they fall within an exception, which in this case must be fair
use.173 This, of course, raises the persistent question whether copying
for personal space-shifting is a fair use. Although the appellate courts
have never directly addressed the issue,174 the Ninth Circuit once
indicated in dicta that the practice "is paradigmatic noncommercial
personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act."'75 On
the other hand, the Copyright Office has made it clear in several
rulemaking actions that it does not accept that this conclusion is
necessarily correct, especially with regard to motion pictures.176 As
with the Supreme Court's decision in Sony regarding time-shifting,
the key factor in the analysis will be whether Fox can demonstrate
that Hopper Transfers will diminish economic opportunities for it to
earn revenue, such as through digital download services.'77 If Fox and
Anywhere to retransmit live transmissions so that they can personally watch them in other
locations definitely do not infringe performance rights. Of course, if the retransmissions are
made to public facilities, then the customer has made an infringing use. See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2012) (definition of performing a work publicly). Also, it may not be legal for subscribers to make
reproductions on the DVR for the purpose of watching the content in another location. See supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) ("Notwithstanding the exclusive rights provided in
section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright."). The Copyright Act provides several other more specific limitations on copyright
owners' exclusive rights, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-22 (2012), but they do not apply to individuals
making reproductions to facilitate the viewing of copyrighted materials on other devices or in
other locations.
174. The plaintiffs in the Cablevision litigation did not challenge whether it was legal for
Cablevision's customers to make unique remote copies for the purpose of time-shifting content so
that they could watch programming later at the original locations housing the cable boxes.
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[If the customers
make the copies,] Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability
expressly disavowed by plaintiffs."). The court noted that its holding does not generally permit
content delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by giving their subscribers the capacity
to make their own individual copies of copyrighted content, and that it did not address
the potential for liability as a contributory infringement under these circumstances. See id.
at 139-40.
175. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit was specifically discussing the Audio Home Recording
Act, which amended the Copyright Act to further protect digital musical recordings, so the
statement may only be relevant to space-shifting of music. See id. However, the court did also
refer to Sony, which addressed time-shifting of movies, as a point of comparison when it made
the statement. See id.
176. See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
201).
177. In Sony, the Supreme Court stated, "[a] challenge to a noncommercial use of a
copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work."
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). This means that
although the defendant raises fair use as an affirmative defense, the burden nevertheless shifts
to the plaintiff to prove economic harm.
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Dish do not settle their differences, this litigation may finally give the
courts the opportunity to conclusively rule on the legality of
reproductions for personal space-shifting, a practice so many people
now take for granted."8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Aereo, but it
so greatly feared how its ruling might affect other technologies that it
failed to provide almost any meaningful guidance at all.179 Although
the Court noted with understated subtlety that those making personal
transmissions must be possessors of the copyrighted works, it never
fashioned the argument within a meaningful framework and instead
rested on the notion that Aereo simply looked like cable. This Article
demonstrated that the Supreme Court could have provided more
substance to its decision by evaluating public performance rights
through the lens of geographic control attributes. Had the Court done
so, it would have been better able to address the dissent's confusion
over volitional conduct. It also would have given much needed
guidance to companies developing convenient new technologies, such
as those recently introduced by Dish, and to district courts that must
analyze these complex questions.
178. The district court granted Dish's motion for summary judgment on this issue,
claiming that "non-commercial time- and place-shifting of recordings already validly possessed
by subscribers ... is paradigmatic fair use under existing law." Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network,
LLC, No. CV 12-04529 DMG(SHx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *81 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2015).
179. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510-11 (2014).
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